Compositionality and Expletives by Sugimoto, Takashi
Title Compositionality and Expletives
Author(s) Sugimoto, Takashi












「意 味 と 虚　辞」





























being made true. Hence the expletive it is shown to be genuinely expletive by this transfor-
mational analysis, for it does not even exist in the deep structure; there is no way z"t can con-
tribute to the determination of the entire meaning of (1) because it depends on (2) for its semantic 
interpretation. This is all fine so far as we have a set of formally related sentences like (1) and 
(2), related in the sense that they each comprise a similar group of words and formatives. In 
fact the existence of a set of formally relatable sentences has always been one of the strongest 
reasons for positing a grammatical transformation. Many of the so-called "standard" trans-
formations serving to account for the paraphrastic relationship of sentences actually relate 
sentences that consist of more or less a similar set of words. 
§2. Let us now turn to other types of sentences that contain expletive elements. 
(3) It rains. (3) 
There is someone in the garden. 
Grammarians generally agree that expletives per se in (3) are semantically null, contribut-
ing in no way to the semantic computation of the meanings of the whole sentences. <4> Neither 
z"t nor there refers to anything, and they are neither anaphoric nor cataphoric. Thus in the 
intended senses of those sentences, <5> the expletives in (3) can be neither questioned nor clefted, 
which is typical of nonreferring subjects: 
(4) *What rains? 
*It is it that rains. 
*What is someone in the garden? 
*It is there that is someone in the garden. 
The point that the fact that the nonreferring (dummy) subjects cannot be questioned is a 
general restriction on English is also noted in Emonds (1972). Thus the following data confirm 
this (drawn from Emonds (1972, p. 56) with the addition, where appropriate, of explicatory 
sentences attached to the right): 
(5) *What is raining? 
*What is John that he is talking to? cf. It is John that he is talking to. 
*What was to the boy that I was speaking? cf. It was to the boy that I was speaking. 
*What's you? cf. It's me. 
*What is the Beatles? cf. Is it the Beatles? 
Who is it? 
*What seemed to John was that the food was stale. 
*What happens is that I don't have any money. 
*What appeared to him was that the train had left. 
Semantics aside, when we turn to the syntax of those expletives in (3), we note that in a 
significant way they behave like a full-fledged grammatical subject in English.<s> Particularly 
notable is the fact that they both participate in Subiect-A uxiNary Inversion and Raising. 
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(6) Subiect-A uxilz'ary .lnversiotz: 
Does it rain? 
Isn't it raining? 
Is there someone in the garden? 
Isn't there someone in the garden? 
Raising (The examples are drawn from Postal (1974)): 
Max expected that Irving would believe there to be a bagel in his lunch box. (p. 199) 
Joe believes Melvin found it to be raining in Madrid. (p. 199) 
There seems to be a man in your bed. (p. 369) 
It seems to be snowing/sleeting. (p. 370) 
The situation then seems again typical of those cases where generative grammarians are most 
happy about: we want those expletives in our syntax, but not in our semantics; this is exactly 
where the grammatical transformations are necessary. And indeed the existential sentence in 
(3) is often derived from a structure underlying (7). 
(7) Someone is in the garden. 
The transformation that does the job in question is of course the time-honored there-Inser-
tion. In spite of some apparent syntactic problems involved in this transformational analysis 
(see for instance Jenkins (1972), especially Chapter 2, Part J), it would have the combined 
advantage of doing away with the problem of semantic interpretation of expletive there and of 
maintaining the principle of compositionality. Again, as was the case with ExtraposiN01z that 
related (1) and (2), such an analysis has some initial plausibility. The situation has a com-
pletely different outlook when we turn to the other expletive in (3). Nobody, it seems, could 
think of a plausible paraphrastic sentence that would be related to it both formally and semant-
ically. And, the it being expletive, we find a variety of analyses presented to reconcile syntax 
and semantics of expletive it that appears in that type of sentences, which, for ease of reference, 
I shall call "weather sentences". Some that have appeared in print are: 
(8) a) Postal (1966, p. 98; 1974, p. 300(7); Darden (1973)) 
Sentence ---------NP VP I I 
Noun Verb 
I I 
rain v weather 
b) Langendoen (1966, p. 211; irrelevant points omitted) 
s 
___------r---_ 
NP Aux VP 
N~ocP I ~ 
I I I 
it out Pres ram 
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c) Emonds (1976, p. 103 fn. 7) 
[[Ll]NP rain]s 
Each analysis is presented with its own syntactic arguments though no semantic justifica-
tion is to be found anywhere in the works cited. This of course does not mean that each 
author agrees on points of semantics of it rains. On closer look, we find each proposal has 
different semantic claims. Thus (Sa) claims that "there is a noun rain which is predicated a 
verb with a meaning similar to 'fall', a verb which ... itself never appears in Surface phrase 
markers (Postal (1966, p. 9S fn. S)." In other words, there is here a predication that is claimed 
between a noun and a verb. Though Postal (1966, 1974) does not touch upon the nature of 
the noun itself, it is presumably a mass noun. The conspicuous absence of analysis of mass 
nouns in either of his work makes it impossible to semantically evaluate his proposal, but it is not 
difficult to imagine that he considers the expletive element it to be semantically vacuous since 
it does not appear in the proposed deep structure of weather sentences. Probably a notion 
like "fall" represented by Vweather is compatible with the notion of mass, but it is not clear to 
me how his analysis would work for other weather verbs like thunder, clear up, etc. as in 
(9) It thunders. 
It clears up. 
Obviously no notion of mass falling down from the sky is involved in the meaning re-
presented by these sentences. Thus, in spite of some syntactic motivations presented for (Sa) 
in Postal (1974, esp. p. 300 fn. 9), we must conclude that the proposed analysis is not satisfact-
ory. Turning now to (Sb), here we find the semantic claim made by the analysis is clearly differ-
ent from that made by (Sa) and, as we will see immediately below, by (Sc). While (Sa) claims 
the existence of predication between mass and whatever is represented by V weather, (Sb) 
says that the predication involved in the sentence it rains is between a place and whatever is 
designated by rain. Put differently, "raining" is claimed to be a property of a place. Though 
I see much truth in this claim, I do not wish to accept it for the following reason. Note that the 
correctness of Langendoen's (1966) analysis lies heavily on the interpretation of the designated 
element out, which, used intransitively, i.e., without any object, is a deictic word. Its meaning 
is a function of contexts. Nonetheless, the truth value of the following sentence, it seems to me, 
remains constant under the circumstances described below. 
(10) It is raining in Cincinnati now. 
Suppose 1) A lives in Cincinnati and Bin Chicago, 2) that A and Butter the sentence (10) 
at the same time, and 3) it is raining in Cincinnati at the time the utterances are made. Clearly 
the truth value of the sentence uttered by A and that uttered by B are the same in spite of the 
fact that they are contextually located in different places with respect to the deictic notion 
represented by out. So there must be something wrong with the proposed analysis. What is 
crucial here is probably the supposition 2) above, which we will later have an occasion to touch 
upon. So unless some plausible interpretation of the word out is provided with respect to the 
deep structure (Sb), we cannot so readily accept the proposal, again in spite of several syntactic 
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advantages the analysis purports to offer (: for details, see Langendoen (1966), especially pp. 
208-211). Finally let us examine (8c). The semantic claim that one can infer from the 
structure is that, the problem of tense aside, the meaning of z"t rains is solely determined by 
whatever is represented by rain in the deep structure (8c). This is tantamount to saying that 
rain is semantically a proposition, for note that the sentence it rains, which is a surface mani-
festation of (8c), represents a proposition capable of having a truth value assigned to it. But 
this is really a weird claim so far as I can see. Just how a verb gets assigned a truth value on 
its own is anyone's guess. But suppose this were possible; the analysis would then face another 
serious problem. Consider the sentence: 
(11) It rains hard. 
Intuitively the word hard is a manner adverb, restricting the way it rains. But since the 
analysis (8c) requires that the verb rain be semantically a proposition once and for all, there is 
no obvious way it can guarantee that hard modifies the verbal notion represented by 1'ain. 
Thus the proposal would have to incorporate some ad hoc restriction on the verb rain, or equi-
valently, the adverb hard; else the analysis would end up making a cauter-factual and counter-
intuitive claim that the adverb hard in (11) is semantically a sentential adverb. This of course 
does not mean that we do not have a mechanism that would enable us to treat a verb phrase 
adverb as a sentential adverb, and vice versa. <S> The point is that so far as the analysis (8c) 
goes such a way out is precluded, for rain is there treated as an unanalyzable single verb, not 
amenable to further decomposition (, which I understand is characteristic of grammarians 
like Emonds). Thus I conclude that (8c) is the least desirable of the three analyses in (8) on the 
simple ground that it trivially does not even meet descriptive adequacy on the semantic level. 
§3. Probably the reason why we have had such a variety of analyses for a relatively simple 
sentence like z"t rains is that generative grammars have not been formally precise and rigorous 
enough in their semantics. True there has been done an almost unbelievably enormous 
amount of in-depth research in the area of English syntax, and more is to come for sure, but 
this fact stands all the more in sharp contrast with the relative paucity of research in formal 
semantics. Never, for instance, was the semantic interpretation that was to be functionally 
bound with the syntax in the overall description of a language formulated in formally precise 
and rigorous terms. Rather semantic interpretation always depended on one's intuition for 
its actual reading. This is true of both interpretive semantics and generative semantics. <9> 
Furthermore there is the fact that linguists in general had not been in close contact with 
logicians and philosophers working on problems of language until relatively recently. But 
the picture has been gradually changing, with an increasing number of linguists and philoso-
phers collaborating on problems of their mutual concern. Particularly significant in this con-
text has been the series of works done by a group of linguists and philosophers originally in 
California, of which Montague (1974) stands out head and shoulders above the rest for "the 
incredible theoretical edifice (Dowty (1978), p.v)" he has constructed, possessing "a remarkable 
aesthetic appeal in the overall simplicity and elgeance with which it achieves great richness in 
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detail (z'bid.)."<lo> And it is within Montague's framework that I wish to tackle below the by 
now familiar weather sentence z"t raz'ns, together with the insights afforded by generative gram-
marians. (For such a combined approach of Montague and generative grammars, see among 
others Partee (1975) and Bennett (1974).) Furthermore I would like to follow Bennett (1974) 
in dispensing with individual concepts; though the problem of individuals themselves does not 
appear as such in the ensuing discussion, the approach thus taken will be certainly in line with 
the analysis I shall give with respect to the semantics of it raz'ns, and the parallelism will be 
fairly obvious. Thus I give below the three basic categories in syntax in Bennett (1975, p. 8). 
(12) t is the category of declarative sentences 
CN is the category of common nouns and common noun phrases 
IV is the category of intransitive verbs and certain other verb phrases. 
The mapping f from the syntactic categories to the types of intensional logic is then (op. 
cit., p. 22): 
(13) f(t) =t 
f(CN)=f(IV)=<e, t) 
f(A/B)=f(A//B)=«s, f(B)), f(A)) 
whenever A, BE Cat 
It is true that the system that is a consequence of (12) and (13) cannot per se deal with the 
the temperature is ninety and the temperature rises puzzle, but at the same time it is also true 
that the resultant system is far simpler than the original PTQ model and is much more in 
accord with our intuition. 
§4 Of the two expletive sentences in (3), the second we presume is to receive a transformational 
analysis; it would be derived from a sentence like (7) via the application of there-Inso·tz'on, 
which is semantically an identity mapping, that is, if (7) translates into f', then the result of 
applying tlzere-Insertion, the existential sentence in (3), also translates into f'. <11 > And we will 
devote the remainder of this paper to the discussion of the other expletive sentence in (3), re-
peated below: 
(14) It rains. 
You will recall that, as was touched upon in §2, there does not seem to be any easy trans-
form of (14) that may be related to it by a syntactic transformation. If there be such, we would 
probably adopt it for an object of our semantic interpretation if for no other reason than that it 
would enable us to maintain the principle of compositionality. But in the absence of such a 
transform, we would like to consider that (14) should be interpretable on its own, the whole 
meaning being a function of the meanings of its parts; for note that, unlike some frozen idioms 
and formulaic expressions, weather sentences like (14), as we have seen in §2, are possessed of 
grammatically significant syntactic versatility. The problem we face then is obviously this: 
Since the syntactic pattern of (14) is completely in parallel with the following sentences: 
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(15) John walks. 
The man runs. 
Every woman talks. 
it is to be derived by a rule like PTQ S4, which is: 
S4. If aEPt1 rv and 8EPrv, then F4(a, 8)EPt, where F1(a, 8)=a8' ando' is the result 
of replacing the first verb (i.e., member of Brv, BTv, B1v ;t, or B1v ;;Iv) in 8 by its 
third person singular present. 
If so, then its translation into intensional logic would be by T 4, which is: 
T4. If 8EPt;Iv, {3EP1v, and 8, f3 translate into 8', {3' respectively, then F4(a, {3) 
translates into 8' C {3'). 
But it in t"t rains is an expletive element, which, at its face value at least, is semantically 
null. Thus we are here unable to maintain the otherwise plausible principle of composition-
ality. Furthermore, as it stands, this would mean that we cannot compute out the meaning of 
z! raz";zs, which, in its turn, would mean we cannot assign any truth value to it at any world-time 
index <i, j). So something must be wrong here, for clearly t"t raz·ns denotes a proposition, 
capable of being assigned a truth value t any world-time index <i, j). For reasons mentioned 
in §2 with respect to (8c), we do not wish to say rains in z"t rains translates into a proposition; 
nor do we wish to say that rain denotes a property of a place, the point which was discussed and 
rejected with respect to (8b), though this may be possible. But it cannot be a property of 
individuals, for we do not say (cf. (15) above): 
(16) John rains. 
The man rains. 
Every woman rains. 
Let us then for a moment reflect upon sentences in (15). There it is understood within 
Montague grammar that walking, running, and talking are the respective properties of John, 
the unique object that has a property of being a man, and everything that has a property of be-
ing a woman. Now if we believe in the correctness of the principle of compositionality and 
syntactic/semantic analyses of simple intransitive sentences, S4 and T4, it must be that a similar 
thing is going on in (14). Specifically rain must be designating a property of something. 
What this something is may seem a little diffucult to find out, but the only reasonable entity 
here capable of being predicated of such a property as is designated by rain is, it seems, a mo-
ment of time or a time interval. It then probably is not after all an expletive element devoid 
of any semantic content, but rather a linguistic expression referring to a moment or an interval 
of time, or equivalently a set of properties thereof. Though it is perhaps easy to incorporate 
both moments and intervals of time, let us below assume that it is only a moment of time that the 
so-called expletive z"t in weather sentences refers to. <12l Rain then denotes, at a world-time 
index <i, j), a set of moments of time, or a characteristic function thereof. The intension of 
rahz is thus a property of moments of time. This way of interpreting weather sentences can 
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overcome the shortcomings that are inherent in analyses like (Sa, b, c) and yield a reasonable 
assignment of truth values thereto, which point will be discussed in §6 after a brief sketch of 
formalism in §5. Thus while I do not believe that the expletive it in weather sentences like 
z"t rains is semantically null, a different analysis will be also suggested toward the end of §7 
based on the one to be given in the next section that interprets the weather sentences in exactly 
the same way as in §5 and yet makes it in weather sentences expletive on the surface. 
§5. To generate representative weather sentences within the PTQ framework, augmented of 
course with a transformational component (: see comments and references in §3), it will be 
necessary to enrich the vocabulary with adequate expressions of the following kind. Let us 
for the present paper adopt the convention of drawing a bar above a symbol to indicate that the 
symbol that appears below the bar is to be an expression of time level (: an analogous conven-
tion is adopted in Delacruz (1974) for expressions of proposition level). This would make the 
parallelism between our rules and PTQ S4 and T4 above obvious, and also that between our 
position on the concept of moments of time and that of Bennett (1974) on the concept of indi-
viduals (cf. §3). 
Basic syntactic categories (cf. (12)) 
IV is the category of time level intransitive verbs and certain other verb phrases. 
Basic expressions of category A, i.e., BA 
Brv= {rain, snow, thunder, clear up} 
Br= {ito, it1, it2, ... itn, ... } (Note that Tis a derived syntactic category tflV.) 
Brv1N= {hard} 
The mapping f from the syntactic categories to the types of intensional logic ( cf. (13)) 
f(IV)=(m, t) (where m is a fixed object distinct from s, e, and t.) 
Rules of functional application 
S4'. If aEPt;iV and oEPiV, then F4, (a, o)EPt, where F4' (a, o)=it o' and o' is the 
result of replacing the verb by its third person singular present. (Similarly 
with S17') 
S10'. If oEPiV;iV and {3EPiV, then F7(o, {3)EPrv, where F7(o, {3)={3o. 
Translation rules 
Basic rules 
itn translates into RR {rn} (R is a variable of type (s, (m, t)); rn is a variable of 
type (m).) 
Rules of functional application 
T4'. If oEP11iV, {3EPrv, and o, f3 translate into o', {3' respectively, then F4' (o, {3) 
translates into o' C {3'). (Similarly with T17') 
T10'. If oEPiV;iV, {3EPiV, and o, f3 translate into o', {3' respectively, then F7(o, {3) 
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translates into 01 c f3'). 
Since we have introduced a new fixed object m into our intensional logic, we need further 
addition to the system. Let A, I, J be any sets, which may be regarded as the set of individuals, 
the set of possible worlds, and the set of moments of time respectively. Then Dm, A, r, J, or the 
set of possible denotations of type <m> corresponding to A, I, J is: 
Dm,A,I, 
In addition to the assignment function g whose domain is a set of individual variables and 
whose range is A, we have another assignment function g that assigns to every variable of 
type <m> a particular moment of time j such that j EJ. Suppose M is an interpretation (or 
intensional model) of the form <A, I, J, ~, F) of the usual sort, then, whereas aM';, i> g (i.e., the 
extension of a with respect toM, i, j, and g) is g(a) where a is a variable of the appropriate te, yp 
f3M' ;, i• ii is g(f3)-moreover, g(f3)=j, where f3 is a variable of type <m>. Since we do not have a 
constant of type <m> in this fragment, we do not have to worry about the definition of its 
intension. 
We can now give a syntactic and semantic analysis of (14) it rains: 
An analysis tree: it rains, 4' 
~ 
it2 rain 
Translation: rain -)- rain' 
it2 -)- PP {x2} 
it rains -)- PP {xz} Crain') :T4' 
The denotation of z"t rains at the index <i, j) is then: 
[PP {x2} Crain')]M' ;, i• g, i 
Though logically equivalent, we can give a more conspicuous translation of it rains above by 
means of the usual logical reductions, and its denotation at the given index. Read the dotted 
arrow"--'>-" as "converts to"; then we have: 
PP {x2} Crain') 
----+ hrain' {x2} 
----+ v hrain'(x2) 
---+ rain' (x2) 
Thus the denotation of it rains is any of the following equivalents: 
[PP {x2} Crain,)]M';, i• g, ii=[rain'(x2)]u,;, i• g, ii=rain' M, ;, i(x2)M';, i• ii 
=rain' u, ;, i (j) 
The last formula (, and thus, equivalently, any other formula above) says that the moment of 
time j has the property of raining at the given index <i, j). So the expression it rai;zs is true 
at the index <i, j) iff it is raining at the moment j in the possible world j, i.e., iff j E [F (rain')] 
(<i, j)). 
Similarly it has rained, for instance, is analyzable as follows. 
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An analysis tree: it has rained, 14' 
•t~• 1 4 ratn 
Translation: rain ~ rain' 
it4 ~ PP {X4} 
it has rained~ H :Pf> {x4} Crain') :T17' 
The denotation [!:fPP { 4x}(rain')]M.i, i' g, !i is 1 iff 
[PP {x4} (rain')]M';, i' g, !i is 1 for some j' such that j' ~ j and j' ~ j. 
As we have seen above, the sentence z"t has raitzed is then true iff j' E [F(rain')J (<i, j'>). 
§6. The analysis of weather sentences in §5 is free from the shortcomings that those in (S) 
possess. Unlike (Sa), our analysis also works for sentences like it thunders, it has cleared up, 
etc. for which (Sa), as we have noted, does not seem to have any unified solution. But clearly 
these sentences ought to be treated on a par with z"t rains type sentences. Note that we can 
generate them in a completely parallel fashion since the verbs rain, snow, thunder, clear 
up are all members of Brv. 
Unlike (Sb), our analysis assigns the same truth value with respect to (10) under those circum-
stances described there. Thus regardless of the deictic orientation of the constant out (or, for 
that matter, any deictic word or expression of place), it is true at the timet the utterance is made 
iff it is raining in Cincinnatti at t. That this is the interpretation our fragment assigns is clear 
from the brief exposition of our grammar in §5. Unlike (Sc), our analysis captures the fact 
that rm·n is an intransitive verb and that hard is a manner adverb that goes with a verb phrase. 
Thus it rains hard is generated in the following fashion: 
it rains hard 
. ---------------ltG rain hard, 7 
hard~ain 
which is translated into: 
:Pf> {XG} Chard' Crain')) 
Clearly hard is nothing but a verb phrase adverb in our analysis in contradistinction to the 
counter-intuitive claim made by (Sc) that it is a sentential adverb. We see then that our propos-
ed fragment of English syntax and semantics for weather sentences is to be preferred to those 
given in (S), the latter suffering from several syntactic and semantic drawbacks that ours is 
free from. 
§7. As I have indicated in §5, there is a way open for us to maintain that the expeltive it that 
appears in weather sentences is really expletive and yet give the right kind of semantic inter-
pretation as outlined above. And of course the key to such solution is the use of syntactic 
transformations. But before we come to this problem, several comments are probably in order 
here since I believe the essentials of our analysis to be correct. 
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The introduction of barred categories like IV, T, etc. may be objected to on the grounds 
that it would lose the linguistically significant generalization in that a category like IV is no 
different than IV and that accordingly they are to be so treated in syntax. The objection is 
well taken, but we have to bear in mind that it is also a significant fact that expressions like 
walk, go, find the woman of the category IV denote, at a given index, a set of individuals and 
are clearly different from verbs like snow, rain, thunder, which belong to IV. In Montague 
grammar, to claim that these two are of the same syntactic category is to claim that they trans-
late into expressions of the same intensional type, which probably nobody would wish to main-
tain. But to say that these two claims do not necessarily have to be entertained at the same 
time would be to say that the mapping f from syntactic categories to intensional types ceases to 
be a function, which would be even more undesirable and devastating. So the putative 
generalization has to be achieved in some other way. Perhaps the linguistically significant 
generalization that IV and IV behave syntactically alike should be captured by setting up some 
convention to the effect that every syntactic rule that would affect X would also affect X, X, etc. 
(but probably not vice versa) (See Delacruz (1976) for example of proposition level verbs, 
common nouns, etc.). 
While I said a verb like rain translates into the constant rain', which denotes at <i, j) a set 
of moments of time, the translation actually would cover only those cases where there is no overt 
time expression present. But now consider sentences like: 
It rained at seven o'clock. 
The sentence would be true iff sE[F(rain')] (<i, j')). Thus we would have to be able to 
say that [x]M' i, i', ii=s. Though we need to have further analyses of prepositional expressions 
of time, such reading may be assigned if we analyzed rain as translating into: 
,\y,\x [rain' (x) & x=y] 
and equated y with the denotation of seven o'clock.<13> Other modifications might be 
necessary, but I do not wish to go into them here since the point of the present paper is to 
bring up the point that a verb like rain denotes a set of moments of time. 
Bringing in names like seven o'clock, 8:30, etc. will enable us to treat a set of sentences of 
another kind that also contain an occurrence of the so-called expletive z"t; they are sentences like: 
It is seven o'clock. 
It is 8 : 30. 
Suppose we have the following translation: 
be-+ APA.xP{~[:X=J]} 
seven o'clock-+ PP {s} (sEJ) 
then, given our analysis of z"t as above, it is seven o'clock would translate into: 
f>f> {xo} [A A.PA.xP{:y[x=y]} CQQ {s} )] 
which is equivalent to: 
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Xo=S 
Thus, it is seven o'clock is true at a given index <i, j) iff: 
j=s 
which is precisely what we wish to have. 
Now I shall turn to the problem brought up in the first paragraph of this section. While 
we have been assuming that English temporal specification involves only one notion of time 
with respect to a sentence, this would ultimately turn out to be wrong. For instance, accord-
ing to Reichenbach (1947), Smith (1978), etc., at least three notions of time are involved in the 
temporal specification: speech time, reference time, and event time. "Speech Time (ST) 
is ... the moment of utterance. Reference Time (RT) is the time indicated by a sentence, .... 
Event Time (ET) refers to the moment at which the relevant event or state occurs,....... In 
(2) all three times are different: 
(2) Marilyn had already won the prize last week . 
... ST is the moment of utterance, RT is last week, and ET is an unspecified time prior to last 
week. (Smith op. cit. p. 44)" To incorporate such notions with their due ramifications is re-
grettably beyond the scope of the present paper (for details see the above work). Recall here 
now that Montague (1974) identifies "events with properties of moments (p. 150)." In this 
respect then our semantic analysis of rain, F(rain'), is also an event, for [F(rain')] (<i, j)) 
denotes a set of moments of time. Probably events like rising is of the category CN, and 
f(IV)=f(CN)=<m, t). The noun rain thus is a member of BeN, while the verb rain is, as 
we have seen above, a member of B!v· Such conjecture is partly confirmed by using some 








before I the rain 
after 
The introduction of CN thus seems fairly straightforward, but actually we would face one im-
mediate difficulty here, for observe that we do not say: 
The rain 









John's singing of the Marseillaise rained 
thunders 
snows. 
It is when we try to clean up this mess that we come upon a possible solution to the problem al-
luded to at the very outset of this section. Suppose we invoke a syntactic transformation that 
would have the effect of obligatorily postposing a constant of category T and making it a senten-
ce final prepositional phrase with the head preposition at. Upon application of this trans-
formation, T time, the following changes would take place: 
The rain snows. ---;.. It snows at the rain. 
The rain thunders. -> It rains at the thunder. 
The rising of the sun rained. ---;.. It rained at the rising of the sun. 
Joh's singing of the Marseillaise rained. ---;.. It rained at John's singing of 
the Marseillaise. 
The introduction of it in the subject position here follows the general convention regarding the 
vacated NP position (cf. (1) and (2) in §1). Such a transformation would obviate the necessity 
of analyzing rain as ,.\y,.\x[rain'(x) & x=y], mentioned a few paragraphs ago because of the 
following conversion: 
Seven o'clock rained. ---;.. It rained at seven o'clock. 
One consequence of this approach is that while it in it rains corresponds to PP {x}, it in it rains 
at seven o'clock correspons to nothing of semantic significance but is a designated element 
introduced by a syntactic transfonnation. But then if one would like to make Ttimc a little 
more general, one could drop the restriction of constant-hood of the moved category T from the 
structural description, with the convention that a surface variable be deleted (or, equivalently, 
that a subscripted expression be deleted). <15> This would enable us to say that all the occurr-
ences of z"t in 
It rains. 
It is seven o'clock. 
It rains at the thunder. 
It rained at the rising of the sun. 
are genuinely expletive. Thus this solution is another way of maintaining the compositionality 
principle with respect to it rains and expressions of that ilk. We seem then to have gone the 
whole cycle: we started out with the expletive it, rejected it, and then resurrected it. Which-
ever may be the more preferable analysis, our net gain is the following semantic representations 
of the four sentences above. 
~ 
~:P {x} Crain') A 
~:P {x} [..\P..\xP{y[x=yJ) CQQ {s}) 
~VY[/\x[thunder'(x) <-> x=y] & :P {y}] Crain') 
PVy[/\x[rising of the sun'(x) <-> x=y] & P {y}] Crain') 
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Notes 
1. For discussion of this principle, see for instance Cresswell (1973), in which it is also called Frege's 
principle. Katz (1973) takes up the problem of compositionality from the viewpoint of the computation 
of meanings of idioms. While Bolinger (1977) contains excellent essays attempting to prove "that any 
word which a language permits to survive must make its semantic contribution (p. ix)," the approach 
there taken is from the standpoint of functional sentence perspective, differing in significant respects 
from ours and thus had to be excluded from the general discussion below. Readers interested in the 
pragmatic account of the reference of the so-called expletive it may wish to turn to Chapter 4 of his 
book. 
2. The remark regarding the status of the empletive it also applies to the Intrapositz.on approach, but not 
to the position that maintains that it-t/tat complementizer is present in the deep structure; such a posi-
tion has the burden of giving the semantic interpretation of it and that as they exist in the deep struc-
ture, else it is forced to abandon the priciple of compositionality. 
3. I take the verb raz·n as a representative word of a set of similar words like snow, thunder, sleet, clear 
up, etc., which in one way or another have to do with the weather. 
4. Jespersen (1924, 1927) seems to consider that "it (i. e., the expletive it /TS) really refers to something 
definite (Jespersen (1927) Part VII, p. 149)," and he cites from Shakespeare's Twelfth Night "The 
raine it raineth euery day." Another example of the expletive it being used anaphorically is: 
The rain is rainig all around 
It falls on field and tree 
It rains on the umbrellas here, 
And on the ships at sea.- R. L. Stevenson. 
But such anaphoric or referential use is at best marginal in modern English, and indeed Jespersen (1933, 
p. 155) says, "But in agreat many cases it is used in such a way that it is not possible in this way to 
point to something specifically referred to.'' And he gives sets of sentences that contain an occurrence of 
such "unspecified" it, which are worth reproducing here: 
Natural phenomena: 
It rains (snows, freezes, clears up, etc.). 
It is cold today. It has been cloudy all day. 
Time: 
It is half-past six. 
It was a long time before he came to. 
It is Sunday tomorrow. 
Space: 
How far is it to Charing Cross? 
It is a long way to Tipperary. 
Objects of idiomatic verb phrases: 
We must have it out some day. 
That is coming it rather strong. 
I say, you are going it! 
I will give it him hot. 
If you are fatmd out, you will catch it. 
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To lord it, queen it. 
etc. 
Prepositional phrases: 
M ke a day of it. 
Make a clean breast of it. 
There is nothing for it but to submit. 
You are in for it. 
It is only the first set of sentences that is taken up in this paper, with the second one treated in an 
analogous fashion in §7. The last two sets are probably to be taken as idioms. As for it in expressions 
of space, perhaps it is possible to maintain the principle of compositionality and say that it in those 
instances really refers to something. But I shall not deal with this problem in this paper. Re idioms 
and the principle of compositionality, see Katz (1973). With respect to pragmatic account of it in these 
and several other types of sentences, see Bolinger (1977), Chapter 4. 
5. Under normal circumstances, the intended senses of those sentences in (3) appear most obvious when 
the initial word is destressed. 
6. For the notion of subject in general from the viewpoint of universals I refer the reader to Keenan 
(1976), where, incidentally, one can find remarks regarding the reference of expletives (: see for instance 
p. 317). 
7. Postal (1974) adopts an English-as-a-VSO-Ianguage hypothesis, but the point of our discussion is not 
affected in any way whether one takes the VSO or SVO hypothesis. 
8. Dowty (1976, p. 230) for instance has a postulate that has such an effect. 
9. It is of course erroneous to believe that the semantic representation as proposed by generative seman-
tics grammarians does not have to be interpreted, a point which is well appreciated by a grammarian 
like Lakoff (a talk given in 1975 MSSB Workshop on syntax and semantics at Berkely, California) but 
which so often seems to go neglected. 
10. I do not wish to be taken that I am belittling works done by other researchers. There is no article or 
book, if seriously written, that is not worth reading. The best and most excellent introduction to date 
to Montague grammar is, in my mind, Dowty (1978) though of course Partee (1975) is also indispens-
able. 
11. For more specific proposal of syntactic trnsformations within the general framework of Montague gra-
mmar, see Partee (1975, 1976), Bennett (1974), etc. 
12. We are thus regarding a sentence like it rains as an instantaneous event; there is probably no harm 
in this choice, the interval being a set of continuous moments of time. Aside from the question of 
whether there really is an instantaneous rain, which I think there is, if need be, we can for instance 
let variables like x, y, etc.,which will be introduced soon, range over time intervals; this would of 
course necessitate changes in other parts of the grammar to be presented, but we will not go into this 
in this paper. 
13. Here, and in what follows, we assume, contrary to the fact, that expressions like seven o'clock, 8:30, etc. 
arc proper names. Thus seven o'clock, for instance, is equivalent to seven o'clock a.m, may 25, 
A.D. 1980 (among many others). This simplifying assumption does not affect in any way, the point argued 
for in this section. 
14. For details, see Vendler (1967), Chapter 5. 
15. Note that as it stands, the it introduced in S4' is neither a constant nor a variable of category T: it 
is rather a syncategoramatic element grammatically belonging to no category. So, for the suggestion to 
work properly, we have to replace the part in S4' that reads F4'(a,o)=it 8' by F4(a,8)=a8', which 
revision is assumed to have been made in the following discussion. 
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